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The religious ideas may influence various political institutions. For example, in the 
United States the tolerant and liberal theology with God of caring and concern 
predated social approval of the idea of welfare state. This kind of theology and the 
American popular religion supported the formation of the context within which 
Franklin Roosevelt could successfully conduct the welfare legislation of the 1930s - 
the conventional practice of conceptualising this connection suggest that ethics 
(ethical norms, often derived from religion) provides the link. 
 
The article is basically concerned with some aspects of cultural situation of the 
Roman Catholic Church in Poland from the point of view of defining the Church as a 
cultural group. The Churchs self-definition and the mental aspect of domination-
subordination relations between Church and the State affect the 'social 
understanding' of the processes of EU's reshaping. 
 
The Roman Catholic Church is the biggest religious organisation in Poland that has 
been closely connected both with state and culture for over one thousand years. A 
very significant fact is that some 93-94% Poles declare their affiliation to the Catholic 
Church [Adamczuk 1991, Mariański 1993, Marody 1994, Religijność Polaków 1984-
1994 1994, Stachowski 1997, Religijność Polaków w III RP 1999]. This situation 
suggests that the present Churchs point of view may modify some aspects of these 
processes on the societal and national levels. The basic distinctions in recognition of 
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the true meaning of the European Community by the Church's hierarchy and very 
influential, religiously fundamentalistic group are presented. 
 
In spite of the new socio-political system that emerged in Poland after World War II 
and the policy of communist authorities that strongly aimed at atheism of the society, 
the Church was able to successfully build up religious life and restructure its actions 
and authorities.  
 
In Poland during the communism, the Church itself functioned as a relatively 
independent social institution not affected very much by the political system. It 
enjoyed the actual, even if not formal, status of primus inter pares among other 
religions. It also served a real political function of the only legal opposition to the 
state organisation. This opposition had a moral, cultural as well as a political 
character. The state's struggle with the Church led to the built-up of the latter 
institutional reinforcement. Functioning at the same time as a centre of political 
criticism, the Church imposed restrictions on the wrongdoing of the Communist Party 
apparatus. 
 
Observing post-transformational Polish reality (the political system transformation in 
Poland has started in 1989) we can see that the position of the RCC has been and 
continues to be special. Now, it starts to play the role of an important component of 
the official culture. The Church ceased to play the role of the only institutional 
exponent of the Opposition. Besides, with the emergence of the post-communist 
statehood and the possibilities of free expression of opinion, the Church lost its 
special character of the "only spokesman of the legal opposition". The modifications 
of the social and political environment of the Church activities exert the alternation 




From many points of view the Church can be defined as a culturally dominant social 
group in Poland. Its authorities are often able to force upon others their own 
normative system, and the patterns of actions approved by the institutional Church. 
One can observe the processes of monopolisation by the Church of the defining of 
social situations as right and desirable. 
 
Some of the Church's members (including the part of the hierarchy) are, at the same 
time, adherents of the opinion that the RCC in Poland is (still and even increasingly 
so) oppressed and the social and religious life of its members is often defined and 
treated as a thing of a minor importance.  
 
After the political system transformation in Poland the situation and the main players 
in the public sphere changed. Now, the RCC dominates within almost all sectors of 
social life. Together with the ongoing reconstruction of social structures, economic 
and political life, the Church has started to play the role of the key socio-political 
power. 
 
Polish society--considerably supported in its activities by the Church--has won the 
battle on abolition of communist order. Atheism is no longer the state's official 
ideology. People, for whom the Church was the moral and often political support 
helping them to knock down the totalitarianism, became suddenly members of the 
state's authorities. These people--in most cases Catholics--have brought into politics 
their previous connections with the Church. The similarities between new governing 
politicians' and the Church's ideology evoked the situation in which the basic 




After the fall of communism in Poland, the feeling of victory has influenced and 
inspired the public Church's activities. It has been manifested very often in the 
intense support for the economic and political changes. Many of the Church's 
activists and leaders of Polish Christian-national political parties have been using this 
situation to demand for the Church the dominant status in the country.  
 
One can observe a process of institutionalisation of religion in Poland, in terms of 
acquiring by the RCC the influence on state's institutions. It can be viewed also as 
obtaining a status of culturally dominant group in the country. It involves also many 
acquisitions against the Church that, for example, it is willing to establish a religious 
state in Poland. 
 
Now in the late 1990s, a Polish political scene is dominated by continuous discussions 
and comments on various social issues connected with transformation of the 
economy, on the one hand, and with the Polish participation in the international 
political and economic structures, on the other. One stream of discussions comprises 
analyses of the polarised communities of beneficiaries and those who lost during the 
Polish system transformation. Another group of comments refers to various aspects 
of Polands accession to the European Union and NATO.  
 
Before we discuss the problem of the Polish Catholic Churchs approach to 
integration processes between Poland and the EU, let us have a short look at the 
scope and level of support for Polands accession to this organisation as it is shown in 
public opinion polls carried out in our country in the last few years. Generally 
speaking, the reports of the survey centres prove that majority of our society is in 
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favour of these processes. And thus, social acceptance for the integration goes up to 
60-70% [Na drodze do Unii Europejskiej 1998]. Moreover, Poles declare more positive 
attitudes towards the European Union than representatives of other Central 
European countries that are now running for the accession. These attitudes appear 
both in public opinion polls and in politicians' and opinion leaders' declarations. At 
the same time, in the latter group as many as 95% of the declarations are positive, 
with average 81% of supportive attitudes at this part of Europe [Skotnicka-Illasiewicz 
1999: 72]. 
 
The declared motivation of support for European integration in the national opinion 
polls refers to: a) possible opportunities for Poland to take advantage of clear 
regulations in a sphere of economic activity; b) positive geopolitical revision of the 
state's position; c) broadly understood civilisation progress connected with the access 
to the Western economic, technological and environmental standards [Skotnicka-
Illasiewicz 1999: 75-76]. 
 
These pro-integrative opinions, however, are not stable. One third of the respondents 
(34%) think that the Western countries want integration in order to strengthen their 
power and importance and strive for subordination of weaker Eastern European 
countries [Na drodze do Unii Europejskiej 1998]. Moreover, support for the 
integration has been falling since 1997. At the same time, the feelings of fear and 
doubts or even opposition against the integration have been increasing steadily. 
These opposition attitudes have grown from 6% in 1994 to 19% in 1998 [Na drodze 
do Unii Europejskiej 1998]. The main fears refer to: a) the collapse of Polish 
agriculture, which seems an inevitable effect of Polands accession to the EU (43%); 
b) a higher unemployment rate and purchase of the Polish property by a foreign 
capital (37%); c) the fall of industry and lower living standards in our country (18%) 
[Polacy o Unii Europejskiej 1998]. The analysis of numerous public opinion polls 
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shows a correlation between predictions of possible opportunities to acquire higher 
living standards and support for the integration processes. On the other hand, one's 
disappointing living conditions (financial status) and the lack of prospects for the 
future, as well as the awareness of the gap in these respects between Poland and the 
EU countries feed scepticism towards the integration. Such attitudes are dominant 
among farmers and in rural communities in general [Opinie o negocjacjach Polski... 
1998]. 
 
It is more difficult to present any detailed information on the Polish clergymens 
attitudes towards integration with the EU. The reason is that, in fact, there is no 
tradition to take public opinion polls in these communities in Poland. The attempts to 
study this community's opinions were made, but they usually met the refusal on the 
side of local bishops and other priests. So there is not enough empirical material to 
carry out any sound analysis. It is a real pity because this kind of information would 
be very important since for a remarkable majority of Poles a supportive opinion of 
the Polish RCC means legitimacy for many public decisions, political ones included 
[Hałas 1999: 202]. 
 
This disinclination of the RCC in Poland to opinion surveys was successfully overcome 
at the turn of 1997/1998, when one survey centre managed to receive permission 
from local bishops to carry out an opinion poll in a group of nearly 600 priests (half of 
them were parish priests and curates). Even though, the group was not, in my 
opinion, selected correctly because the respondents did not constitute a 
representative sample for the whole Polish clergy, the survey is interesting for both 
introductory and general diagnosis of the problem. The results of the survey 
surprised many. It turned out, contrary to commonly accepted opinion and more 
systematic observation, that perhaps as many as 84% of the surveyed clergymen 
would have supported Poland's accession to the EU if a referendum had been held 
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then. The surveyed understood that European integration was an unavoidable 
element of a much broader civilisation process and for this reason fighting against 
this integration was fruitless. At the same time they indicated to the threats the 
Europeanisation of Poland would bring to their priestly ministration. More than half 
of them (54%) thought that the integration would endanger the Church itself. Among 
others, they predicted the growth of consumerism, expansion of religious sects and 
religious indifference.  
 
The influence of the Polish institutional church is noticeable in the two main spheres. 
The prestige of Polish clergymen is built on social belief in their role as mediators 
between sacrum and profane and, in many communities as social leaders. Compare 
to other Catholic churches in Europe, the Polish church holds a strong position. 
Therefore, we can assume that Polish clergy may exert a remarkable influence upon 
different European church structures, for example upon the Commission of European 
Community Episcopates [Hałas 1999: 211]. 
 
In my opinion, the two most influential and opinion making communities in the Polish 
RCC, which shape the Polish Catholics' attitudes towards religious and also public 
issues, are the church hierarchy and the Catholic radicals group. Officially presented 
opinions and declarations of the Polish Episcopate representatives have been 
changing considerably. The opinions of radicals seem relatively stabile with a slight 
tendency to radicalisation of their claims. 
 
On November 4-7, 1997, at an invitation from the EU delegates of the Polish 
Episcopate went to Brussels. The visit was a landmark in the process of the 
hierarchys opinion shaping. The previous declarations of Polish bishops had been 
extremely critical about both the EU itself, the integration and western politicians. 
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Since the authors of these opinions were well known and popular in Catholic 
communities bishops (Primate of Poland included) they received a broad response. 
For example, in August 1995, the Primate of Poland, cardinal Joseph Glemp, had 
expressed publicly the following opinion about the Western politicians: "They aim at 
such attenuation of Central and Eastern European countries so that they themselves 
would not be threatened with these countries' their potential - particularly with their 
spiritual power. [...] There are two ways to admit the poor in the circle of the rich. 
Either the poor will impress the rich with their mentality, industry and personality, or 
they reject their own mentality, way of life and fashions, and will disguise themselves 
in tails or jeans and imitate everything the rich do. It is not just a theory and it should 
be regarded in terms of independence: We should not indulge in the attempt to 
reduce human beings to a level of animals that please themselves with an easy job, 
good food, entertainment and sex" [Papież, biskupi i księża o Europie 1998]. 
 
However, not only this kind of opinions about the EU were spread in the church. In 
their public announcements, some members of the hierarchy presented Europe as a 
"wonderful chance, difficult challenge and great apostolic task for the church to 
achieve". Generally, there grew a clear discrepancy in the Episcopate of Poland 
between declared opponents of the EU and those who looked at the integration 
processes with hope. After the visit in Brussels, the two key Polish bishops: a then 
vice-president of the Polish Episcopate and archbishop Henryk Muszyński as well as a 
secretary of the Episcopate, bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, expressed a firm support of the 
RCC for the integration processes. Their TV declarations suggested that anti-European 
attitudes prove both spiritual and civil immaturity. These declarations were broadly 
commented and quoted in the Polish mass-media. Soon afterwards, the above 
mentioned opinion poll among Polish clergymen was done. At the same time, the 
hitherto opponents of the EU in the Episcopate of Poland started to declare entirely 
different views. The Primate of Poland began to speak about the church that is not 
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afraid of Europe and looks forward to the integration processes with hope. Another 
leading bishop, who once had described Western Europe as a new form of 
totalitarianism , half way through 1998, declared that we, Catholics "want to enter 
the European Union as believing Christians, and now we have the opportunity to help 
it to discover Christianity and many hundred years old values which have always been 
present in its culture" [Z wiarą do Europy 1998]. Now the institutional church 
addressed its members with the desire to work for the accession to the EU. 
Moreover, they showed the advantages of the integration and groundless fears part 
of Catholic communities in Poland were haunted by. Some leaders of hierarchy went 
as far as to include the integration issues in their priestly teachings [Hałas 1999: 212]. 
 
Clergy in Poland is commonly thought to be against Polands integration with the EU. 
Perhaps the reason is that some influential Catholic communities display hostile 
approach by describing the EU and its liberal international culture as another disaster 
which is expected to replace the passed communism. A national Catholic radio 
channel 'Radio Mary' (fifth place in Poland with regard to the number of listeners) 
[Kraj w skrócie. Radia Maryja... 1998] that managed to mobilise a strong social 
movement called 'The Family of Radio Mary' carries out an extensive antiEuropean 
propaganda campaign in which it presents the integration as a plot of the world 
superpowers aiming at the destruction of Poland. The impact of this radio channel 
upon the social views of the clergy is difficult to estimate. However, one should 
remember that about 60% of Polish priests listen to its programmes relatively 
regularly, and half of them tunes them everyday. 
 
This channel, as well as a national daily Nasz Dziennik (Our Daily) as well as 
declarations of people closely connected with this community depict the integrative 
processes as attempts to deChristianise and to divest Poles of their national 
character. As one of best-known Polish priests said: "Making so-called Europeans of 
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us means to create an enigmatic collection of individuals subordinated to 
bureaucratic decisions made by commissaries of the United Europe in Brussels, and 
to achieve the goal the communists wanted to achieve for 44 years" [Kowalski 1997: 
13]. 
 
The 'Nasz Dziennik' publishes a bulletin intended for its 'credible' readers. The 
bulletin published in 1998 consisted of several tens of quotations and short pieces of 
information from different Polish and foreign news agencies. The publication was 
titled Some of the benefits of the European Union. Most of the publication paints 
the reality in the EU a very dark colour. It lacks any comment from the editors but the 
selection of quotations and information, as well as titles of particular units (The EU 
Attacks the Church, Sanctions of the EU on other Countries) clearly show this dailys 
aversion to the integration with the EUs structures. 
 
Summary 
 For the last year and a half, the Polish Roman Catholic Church has been declaring, 
almost unanimously, the lack of fear of the United Europe, and the hopes connected 
with participation of the Church and the whole society in the new reality. The voice of 
the church influences remarkably opinions presented by many influential political and 
social communities. Moreover, the voice is essential because it is listened to and 
obeyed by churchgoers - members of this religious community. There is also another 
reason why the clergymen's attitudes towards the integration should be analysed. 
The Polish church is one of the key powers on the public and political scene. Its 
support means very often legitimacy for decision making. It even can be said that 
many political parties (and consecutive governments) build their group and political 
identity through relating their own ideology and practice to an official position of the 
institutional church and its opinion on various political and social questions, even 
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though Polish society, as I think, and its Catholicism is frequently strongly ritualised 
and pretty superficial. Also, we can assume that the support of Polish society for the 
integration processes is based on not a very deep reflection or strongly rooted 
attitudes. Moreover, it is trivial to claim that political decision making is more 
efficient when it receives a broad social support. Nevertheless, the more effective 
consequences of this type of decisions are, the stronger legitimacy mechanisms they 
require in order to assure the continuity of social order. The processes aiming at 
Poland's accession to the EU's structures arises both fears and hopes. Therefore, the 
church - if Polish bishops continue to show critical but supportive approach to the 
hopes the integration with European economic and cultural union may bring - may 
become a key legitimising tool and ally of the Polish integration attempts and, again, 
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